As always, caveats abound. The social consequences of global warming are always the hardest things to predict. Immigration rates are never driven by physics alone, but depend on plenty of other factors, such as U.S. border policies or the changing structure of Mexico’s economy. And it’s always difficult to tie specific social trends to climate change. People in rural areas have been migrating for a long time, whether to seek out work or because the rainfall’s dried up or the soil’s eroded. Global warming will exacerbate these pressures, yes, but it’s hard to attribute any single event—or single migrant—to man-made climate change. That’s one reason why forecasts of “climate refugees” vary so wildly.

Still, climate-driven migration is a concept that’s received a lot of attention in recent years. As the planet heats up, droughts spread, and sea levels rise, millions of people are going to be uprooted from their homes and farms and move elsewhere. According to a 2007 World Bank report, the vast bulk of this migration is expected to take place within developing countries, with people moving from rural villages to urban centers. One big concern here is that places like Lagos or Dhaka are already swelling exponentially, and their infrastructure can barely keep up, which is why so many “megacities” now sport massive slums.

But there’s also likely to be a fair amount of migration between countries—and the consequences there are much harder to predict. As the rising oceans chomp away at Bangladesh, for instance, as many as 15 million people may have to abandon their towns and villages by mid-century. Partly in response, India has been constructing a 2,100-mile long fence to barricade itself against the predicted influx of climate refugees. This old Greenwire piece by Lisa Friedman features a number of national security experts in India openly fretting about how rising seas will destabilize the borders between the two countries.

There are even consequences for Western politics. Over in Europe, a variety of ultra-right-wing nativist groups take these climate-migration forecasts very seriously. In his excellent book Forecast, Stephan Faris talked to members of Britain’s BNP, which is trying (unsuccessfully) to forge an alliance with greens. A lot of them rant on about how immigration is terrible for the environment, since a person’s carbon footprint swells when he or she moves from a poor country to a rich country. Similarly, in France, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front has started hitting on environmental themes of late. Few actual environmentalists want anything to do with these parties, and there doesn’t seem to be anything comparable in the United States, though if global warming does put pressure on immigration, it’s certainly possible that green nativists could find a toehold here.

Source: The New Republic

“Human movement caused by environmental factors is not new. Natural and human-induced environmental disasters and slow-onset degradation have displaced people in the past, and will continue to do so in the future. Such movement is a normal part of adaptation to change. The ‘newness’ of displacement triggered (at least in part) by climate change is its underlying anthropogenic basis, the large number of people thought to be susceptible to it, and the relative speed with which climate change is to occur, which may hamper people’s traditional adaptive patterns that historically were able to develop over time. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, it is becoming difficult to categorize displaced people because of the combined impacts of conflict, the environment and economic pressures. While the term ‘refugee’ describes only a narrow sub-class of the world’s forced migrants, it is often misapplied to those who move (or who are anticipated to move) for environmental or climate reasons. As explored below, this is not only erroneous as a matter of law, but is conceptually inaccurate as well. In contexts such as the so-called ‘sinking islands’ of Kiribati and Tuvalu in the South Pacific, movement is less likely to be in the nature of sudden flight, and more likely to be pre-emptive and planned. This does not mean it is not ‘forced’, but rather that top-down policy responses and normative frameworks that predicate forced migration on a particular notion of exodus may not match up to realities of movement. Furthermore, while ‘development-induced displacement’ and ‘conflict-induced displacement’ describe primary motivations for movement in certain contexts, field research in Tuvalu and Kiribati highlights the difficulties of describing human movement from these States as exclusively ‘climate-induced displacement’…” To read more, go here.

(1) Analyzing the debate on “climate refugees” and its shortcomings from the point of view of migration studies. The central question is: What are the contentious issues of the environment migration debate? In particular, the question needs to be addressed how migratory strategies are embedded within the broader livelihood context, and beyond climate change.

(2) Reflecting the vulnerability context in accordance with the sustainable livelihood approach from the natural science perspective. The central question is: What do we know about climate and environmental change in developing and developed regions of the world? Contributions should seek to make climate change projections, including the uncertainties of climate change modulation, accessible to participants from the social sciences.

(3) Reflecting the vulnerability context in light of the sustainable livelihood approach from a social scientific perspective. The guiding question is: What impact do climate and environmental change have on the livelihoods of vulnerable groups? The discussions focus on the basic categories of areas and persons which have been identified as highly affected by climate change. The categories include fields crucial for livelihood such as food and water systems, basic services such as health and housing systems, and income generation.

(4) Presenting results from field research on the relationship between vulnerabilities and capabilities. The guiding question is: What do field research and case studies tell us about vulnerabilities and capabilities with regard to mobility? We interpret mobility as a potential asset that might have been consciously chosen to mitigate the effects of environmental change. As vulnerabilities and capabilities do not depend only on environmental change, contributions should consider structures of inequality and how relevant institutions, policies, and processes feed into constraints and opportunities for mobility.

(5) Deliberating upon approaches that promise to incorporate the capabilities perspective more deeply into applied methodologies. The leading question is: How can we support and benefit from the capabilities perspective in our research on environmentally induced migration? Contributions should aim to establish a basis from which the academic community can begin to develop an elaborated approach to the questions at stake.

(6) Presenting results from field research that focuses on those who could be called environmental refugees in a more narrow sense. These are the victims of sudden and extreme weather events, whose plight raises the question whether and to which extent a capabilities approach can be applied to their situation as well. Central question for contributions is: How does the mobility perspective apply to the humanitarian crisis caused by climate and environmental change?

(7) Analyzing the political dimension of the acquired findings and insights. At the centre are questions about the role and function of (social) sciences and (social) scientists in public debates and for policy-making. Conference participants are invited to analyze policy approaches, and to examine how a more sophisticated exploration of environmentally induced migration would feed back into those approaches.

Conference format:

• lectures by invited high level speakers
• short talks by young & early stage researchers
• poster sessions, round table and open discussion periods
• forward look panel discussion about future developments

List of confirmed speakers:

• Tamer Afifi – Institute for Environment and Human Security, DE
• Stefan Alscher – Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, MX
• Richard Black – Sussex Centre for Migration Research, UK
• Philippe Boncour – International Organization of Migration, CH
• Volker Böge – The University of Queensland, AU
• Alexander Carius – Adelphi Research/Adelphi Consult, DE
• Anne Dölemeyer – University of Leipzig, DE
• Han Entzinger – The European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, NL
• François Gemenne – Institut du Développement Durable et des Relations Internationales, FR
• Daniela Jacob -Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, DE
• Jill Jäger – Sustainable Europe Research Institute, AT
• Dominic Kniveton – Sussex Centre for Migration Research, UK
• Gordon McGranahan – International Institute for Environment and Development, UK
• Robert McLeman – University Ottawa, CA
• Ludger Pries – University Bochum, DE
• ImmeScholz – German Development Institute, DE
• Cecilia Tacoli – International Institute for Environment and Development, UK

To learn more about the conference, please download here the call for papers.

Seasonal winds, storms and high tides combine to submerge the tiny islands, crowded with huts of yellow cane and faded palm fronds, leaving them ankle-deep in emerald water for days on end.

Pablo Preciado, leader of the island of Carti Sugdub, remembers that in his childhood floods were rare, brief and barely wetted his toes. “Now it’s something else. It’s serious,” he said.

The increase of a few inches in flood depth is consistent with a global sea level rise over Preciado’s 64 years of life and has been made worse by coral mining by the islanders that reduced a buffer against the waves.

Carti Sugdub is one of a handful of islands in an archipelago off Panama’s northeastern coast, where the government says climate change threatens the livelihood of nearly half of the 32,000 semi-autonomous Kuna people.

The 2,000 inhabitants of Carti Sugdub plan to move to coastal areas within the Kuna’s autonomous territory on the Panama mainland. They are eyeing foothills a half-hour walk from the swampy beach areas.

“The water level is rising. The move is imminent,” said Preciado, who has been leading a group of villagers clearing tropical forest for the new settlement.

World leaders have failed so far to reach a global accord to curb the greenhouse gas emissions blamed for climate change. A U.N. climate change conference later this year in Mexico aims to make progress toward a binding agreement.

If the islanders abandon their homes as planned, the exodus will be one of the first blamed on rising sea levels and global warming.

Scientists warn that sea level rise in the next century could threaten millions with a similar fate and some communities as far apart as Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji have already been forced to relocate

“This is no longer about a scientist saying that climate change and the change in sea level will flood (a people) and affect them,” said Hector Guzman, a marine biologist and coral specialist at the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute in Panama. “This is happening now in the real world.”

Climate Change Refugees

The fiercely independent Kuna, famed for rebellions against Spanish conquistadors, French pirates and Panamanian overlords, have accelerated their fate by mining coral, which they use to expand islands and build artificial islets and breakwaters.

Guzman, based at a Pacific island research center on the edge of Panama City, has warned of the risks of coral mining for a decade but says speaking out against a legally permitted traditional activity is “taboo.”

“(The Kuna) have increased their vulnerability to storms, wave action, and above all, the action of the rise in sea level,” he told Reuters.

When Kuna speak in their native language the Spanish words for “climate change” are often among the few foreign words used. While some elders warn that sea level rise will get worse, many locals believe God will keep them safe.

“I don’t know where they get that from — that the land is going to sink and we’d better leave before it happens … Those who want to go, can go. I’m staying here,” said Evangelina, 60, who would not give her last name because she hasn’t told local leadership she’s opposed to moving.

Sea levels rose about 17 cm (about 7 inches) over the last century and experts say the rate is accelerating. In 2007, the United Nations predicted a rise of 18 to 59 cm (7-23 inches) by 2100 but that did not include the accelerated melting of ice sheets in Antarctica and Greenland.

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has warned that seas could rise 2 meters (6.5 feet) by the end of the century, threatening millions of people in cities from Tokyo and Shanghai to New Orleans.

“It’s something you’re going to be seeing more and more,” said Albert Binger, the scientific adviser to the 42-member Alliance of Small Island States, referring to potential victims as “climate change refugees.”

Binger said the Kuna’s coral extraction is a portent for what climate change has in store for other low-lying islands protected by reefs. The greenhouse gas carbon dioxide makes oceans more acidic, killing coral struggling to survive in warmer seas.

Slow Move

While Kuna leaders say their move from cool breezy islands to stuffy forests is imminent, progress has been slow so far and the government does not have a support plan in place.

Carti Sugdub’s islanders have used machetes to carve out a patch of tropical forest but lack machinery to clear the land.

Leaders at nearby Carti Mulatupu are working on an environmental impact study for their move. They reckon setting up a mainland community for 600 people could cost $5 million.

The Panamanian government, which supports the islanders financially by paying for health clinics, schools and poverty programs, has done little to support the relocation plans but officials back the idea.

“Sometimes the community is flooded up to the knees,” said Helen Perez, the schoolmaster at Carti Mulatupu, as his 120 students ran around a sandy school yard by an eroded concrete pier. “The community has taken the decision to move to land.”

Chani Morris, an 82-year-old fisherman, is ready to abandon the islet of Coibita he helped build out of coral 33 years ago. He said he doesn’t sleep well since a flood engulfed the island, destroyed huts and carried away dugout canoes.

“The sea is very bothersome, sometimes it scares me at night,” said Morris, as he fashioned fish traps out of chicken wire. “I’m just waiting for the others to decide when we can move and I’m going to go with them.”

Source: Reuters

If you are interested, please e-mail abstracts of 300 words or less to Michael Gerrard, Director of the Center for Climate Change Law, at michael.gerrard@law.columbia.edu by September 1, 2010.

Michael B. Gerrard
Andrew Sabin Professor of Professional Practice
Director, Center for Climate Change Law
Columbia Law School
435 West 116th Street
New York, New York 10027
Tel: 212-854-3287
Fax: 212-854-7946
michael.gerrard@law.columbia.edu

Developing Adequate Humanitarian Responses by Sarah Collinson

Summary: Diverse and dynamic patterns of internal and cross-border mobility, migration and displacement are the norm in most countries affected by chronic or recurrent humanitarian crises, which often makes it difficult to distinguish between forced and voluntary migrants because different people adopt highly varied strategies to cope or survive, or to respond to new opportunities. The most negative human impacts of climate change will be reflected in sudden and large-scale forced migration.

Many so-called “fragile states” already fail to provide adequate social protection to poor and vulnerable populations, so any climate-related deterioration in human security has the potential to generate extreme welfare needs that are far beyond the capacities or willingness of these states to address. The sheer scale and complexities of displacement will continue to stretch and challenge the normative, institutional and operational frameworks and capacities of the international humanitarian system and national humanitarian actors. Greater priority needs to be given to flexible humanitarian funding and programming suited to addressing chronic as well as acute humanitarian needs and vulnerability in countries where formal climate change adaptation policies are unlikely to be developed. Superficial climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction efforts in countries affected by complex and interacting processes including population growth, economic stagnation, conflict, urbanization and environmental stress, are unlikely to influence the deeper dynamics of vulnerability associated with distress migration.

Migration, the Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence by Frank Laczko

Summary: Four main research challenges are posed by the intersection of climate change, broader environmental hazards and migration: How has the relationship between migration and the environment been conceptualized? To what extent has it been possible to measure the scale of environmental migration? What evidence is available regarding the impact of environmental migration? What research has been conducted on policy responses? Several factors make it difficult to predict the likely scale of environmental migration or its impacts. First, it is difficult to disaggregate the role of climate change from other economic, political and social factors driving migration. Second, migration data are lacking in developing countries that are likely to be most vulnerable to climate change. Third, the lack of data is largely due to the absence of an adequate definition to cover migrants affected by environmental factors under international law. Fourth, climate modeling techniques have not yet begun to account adequately for the impact of individual choice, the potential for international action and the variability of future emissions and meteorological scenarios. In advancing the future research agenda, it is essential from the outset not to focus solely on the potentially negative consequences of migration. Migration can contribute to adaptation to climate change, serving as an important strategy to reduce vulnerability to climate change, increase resilience and enable households to accumulate assets. We need much more evidence to demonstrate these impacts and to inform policy.

Climate Change and Migration: Key Issues for Legal Protection of Migrants and Displaced Persons by Michelle Leighton

Summary: There are a number of scenarios in which people could be displaced or forced to migrate due to climate change and extreme weather events. The movement of people in response to these climate-induced events implicates human rights and humanitarian law. Moreover, the potential indirect impacts from the implementation of disaster response strategies or climate adaptation programs can also raise human rights concerns, particularly if the government undertakes to resettle large numbers of people. Of growing concern are serious gaps in the protection schemes provided by existing law, including the extent to which persons adversely affected by climate change can cross international borders in search of jobs or otherwise engage in labor migration as a means of survival.

This paper discusses various ambiguities and gaps in human rights and humanitarian law which leave many climate change victims who are forced to migrate unprotected and vulnerable to abuse. It presents several policy approaches suggested by humanitarian experts to ensure the adequate protection of climate change migrants. The paper concludes that these gaps will need to be addressed either through the further clarification of humanitarian and human rights principles, or through new international standards related to host countries and countries of origin.

Climate Change and International Migration by Susan F. Martin

Summary: Policymakers in potential destination countries for international migrants have been slow to identify possible responses to manage environmentally induced migration that take these complex interconnections into account. Humanitarian admissions are generally limited to refugees and asylum seekers. Most environmental migrants, forced to flee because of loss of livelihood or habitat and not because of persecutory policies, will be unlikely to meet the legal definition of a refugee. In the absence of legal opportunities to immigrate, at least some portion of those who lose livelihoods as a result of climate change and other environmental hazards will likely become irregular migrants. The challenge in these cases is determining whether these individuals should be given consideration over others who migrate in search of better opportunities. Temporary protection policies that permit individuals whose countries have experienced natural disasters or other severe upheavals to remain at least temporarily without fear of deportation may help a limited number of those forced to flee their homes because of climate change, but these will not address the need for permanent resettlement, particularly for the citizens of island nations that may be affected by rising sea levels. Given concerns in many potential countries of destination about the social, cultural, economic and other impacts of large-scale migration, the policy development process will need to balance domestic interests with the clearly humanitarian implications of climate change induced displacement.

Climate Change, Agricultural Development, and Migration by Philip Martin

Summary: This paper reviews the likely effects of climate change on agricultural development and the resulting implications for internal and international migration. The agricultural sector employed about 1.4 billion of the world’s 3.4 billion workers in 2008. Even without climate change, coming years are likely to witness continuing large-scale migration out of the agricultural sector, particularly in developing countries where farm incomes are significantly lower than non-farm incomes. Climate change, specifically global warming, is likely to accelerate this pace of migration. Several economic models project that global warming will have more effects on the distribution of farm production than global farm output, with new areas becoming viable for farming as a result of higher temperatures. However, far more people are likely to be displaced by global warming than those likely to find jobs in these new farming areas. Existing policy addressing the challenges already faced by agricultural workers as they seek alternative economic opportunities is limited. The likely impact of climate change on the agricultural sector, more displacement, underscores the urgent need for policymakers and the international community to commit greater attention and resources towards developing a package of innovative policies to provide workers with alternative opportunities within the agricultural sector or to ease their out-migration from the sector.

Climate Change, Migration, and Adaption by Susan F. Martin

Summary: In the Copenhagen Accords, adopted in December 2009, the international community agreed on the need for enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation strategies to reduce vulnerability and build resilience in developing countries to meet the challenges of climate change. This paper argues that attention needs to be given to both sides of the environment and migration nexus in adaptation strategies:

(1) Identifying adaptation strategies that allow people to remain where they currently live and work; and

(2) Identifying resettlement strategies that protect people’s lives and livelihoods when they are unable to remain. Since internal migration is the most likely outcome for those affected by climate change and other environmental hazards, highest priority should be given to policies and programs aimed at managing these issues within the most affected countries. Nevertheless, some international migration may well be needed, particularly for the citizens of island nations, necessitating identification of appropriate admissions policies in potential destination countries.

Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict: Receiving Communities under Pressure by Andrea Warnecke, Dennis Tanzler, and Ruth Vollmer

Summary: This paper analyzes the likely intersections between climate change, migration and conflict. The paper identifies some of the most relevant factors that might turn environmentally induced migration into a source of conflict and hold major implications for receiving areas. Scientific literature is still inconclusive about the conflict potential of environmentally induced in-migration and the mechanisms potentially linking it to conflict onset. In general, such mechanisms tend to apply more often in cases of conflict induced as opposed to environmentally induced migration. In a possible chain of events leading from environmentally induced migration to conflict in a receiving area, a host of other factors comes into play, including the causes and type of migration and responses to and perceptions of migration. The impacts of current and future climate trends are likely to increase the pressures that trigger environmentally induced distress migration and migration as a means of adaptation to environmental change. At the same time, climatic and non-climatic factors further strain governance capacities and weaken the stability and the natural resource base of receiving communities, thus making it harder for them to respond to migration appropriately.

Consequently, governments and donors need to invest in (a) extending the knowledge base, for instance by conducting long-term case studies, and (b) supporting mechanisms for receiving communities in devising migration governance strategies based on this knowledge.

Assessing Institutional and Governance Needs Related to Environmental Change and Human Migration by Koko Warner

Summary: Often, the media and policymakers approach the issue of climate change, migration and displacement by asking questions related to “how many” migrants will come. An equally important but less considered question is how national institutions will adapt to accommodate climate change and human mobility. This paper suggests that the capacity of states to adjust to these changes effectively is contingent upon the particular cultural, social, economic and political contexts in which they function and the structural constraints of government machinery. Rather than proposing prêt-a-porter solutions for nation-states, it is important to help states better understand the institutional implications of climate change and human mobility and to aid them in designing custom policies. This paper illustrates these issues with reference to climate change-induced migration in Bangladesh, Mexico and Senegal.

Location of the community of Igarape do Costa. Photo credit: WWF-Brazil

The World Wildlife Fund established the Climate Prep blog to “define climate change adaptation through illustrations of on the ground adaptation projects and scientific adaptation studies, explorations of adaptation concepts, and tracking firsthand the progress of adaptation in the international policy arena.”

This is especially pertinent to the field of climate change-induced migration, as the more preventative measures are taken the less impact climate change should have on migration. A great illustration of the climate’s impact on migration can already be seen in Brazil, where the recent blog post “Building Climate Adaptation Capacity in Amazon Floodplain Communities” claims “many people are migrating in the Santarém region from lake to lake in search of fish.” The post from Climate Prep is cross-posted below.

(Climate Prep) February 12, 2010 – Located in the lower Amazon floodplain of Brazil, the Santarém region harbors important fisheries that many people depend on for employment, food security, government tax revenues, and items to export to both domestic and foreign markets. Climate change is creating difficulties, but not without hope and new opportunities as well.

These fisheries and the services that they provide are known to be sensitive to shifts in the climate. Precipitation patterns are shifting in the Santarém region, with the amount of annual rainfall generally decreasing and floods and droughts becoming more common. Livelihoods for most people around these lakes combine farming and fishing, both of which will be negatively affected by a reduction in rainfall. Less rain will have an especially big impact on the local economy through the quantity of fish that are locally harvested. If regional climate forecasts are accurate, rural livelihoods in lakeshore regions will become increasingly precarious over time.

Because of these shifts in climate, many people are migrating in the Santarém region from lake to lake in search of fish. And more people are even moving from rural regions to cities and other areas of greater economic opportunity. The rate people leave their traditional homes will probably increase as rainfall becomes increasingly variable.

Conflicts also arise over the governance of floodplain resources that so many individuals around Santarém depend on. The issue of how to determine rights to resources in lakes and rivers throughout the region is increasingly contentious.  Should they be monitored and regulated by the state control, or should communities decide how and when fish are harvested? Or should all of these decisions be settled by individuals? So far, neither the state nor the market has been uniformly successful in solving common-pool resource problems. While access to certain “subsistence lakes” is restricted to rural, local communities, the establishment of formal regulation of open-access resources such as fisheries may be an important means to avoid over-exploitation and the resulting degradation of the resource base, in the same way that many harvests of wild species are regulated through hunting or fishing permits globally.

The community of Igarapé do Costa is located on a low sandbank, surrounded by three floodplain lakes called Pacoval, Aramanaí, and Itarim (Figure 1). About 90 families depend on fishing, small gardens and farms, and cattle ranching. Of these, fishing is the main productive activity for 94% of families (Figure 2). During the rainy season, the sandbank is covered by the waters of the Pacoval and Aramanaí lakes, linking the Amazon river and the community. But during the dry season the community is cut off by a massive sandbank and the lakes shrink in size, leaving them 5 km (3 miles) from the mainstream of the river, which is their source of water, transportation, and sustenance. The decreasing amounts of rainfall — especially during drought years — mean that the periods when these communities are separated from the mainstream of the river are getting longer.

The lives of the people of Igarapé do Costa are typical of many people in the Amazon floodplain, especially those located in low sandbanks, far from upland on the banks of river. The key aspect of the Amazon that has determined the ways of life for these communities is the dependable flood pulse that comes every year. Like a clock, it helps regulate the fish species of the Amazon, and the fish regulate the traditional livelihoods and economy for millions of people.

Changes in the rain result in changes in the flood pulse, which alters seasonal fishmovement between the river’s mainstem and the surrounding lakes and wetlands and disrupts the livelihoods of the people. These characteristics make the record of the environmental aspects of climate change and responses of the community´s floodplain a critical element for social environmental sustainability in the region in the coming decades. The implementation of the Climate Witness Project in the community of Igarapé do Costa gives an important contribution to the generation of knowledge.

In my future entries I will present results of the Climate Witness Project that has been implemented in the community of Igarapé do Costa and Santarém region. My analysis considers the study of environmental and social adaptations to climate change at the local level in light of the inherent variability of floodplain ecosystems and the community’s capacity for adaptation.

Source: Climate Prep

Environmental Refugees or Economic Migrants?

As the evidence for global environmental change has accumulated over the past decade, academics, policymakers, and the media have given more attention to the issue of “environmental refugees.” A major concern is whether environmental change will displace large numbers of vulnerable people in the developing world, particularly from rural areas where livelihoods are especially dependent on climate and natural resources. A widely cited article estimated that more than 25 million people were displaced by environmental factors in 1995.¹ Skeptics, however, derided these numbers as speculation.² In fact, despite dozens of academic publications and several international conferences on the issue, well-documented cases of environmentally induced migration are largely limited to dramatic events such as Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the creation of the Three Gorges Dam in China.³ The still unclear consequences of smaller-scale but more pervasive forms of environmental change such as droughts and soil degradation limit our ability to predict the scale and nature of future human displacements under accelerating global environmental change. However, new research shows that environmentally induced migration can be temporary and involve relatively short distances, in contrast to fears of large numbers of environmental refugees moving across international borders.

Demographic Studies of Migration in Ecuador and Indonesia

Migrants respond to economic, social, and demographic factors in addition to the environment. Assessing environmental influences on migration is complex and must take these other factors into account. Research on migration and the environment has also been limited by the lack of appropriate data sets and by disciplinary boundaries between migration studies and environmental science. Recently, however, studies by Sabine Henry, Douglas Massey, myself, and others have used approaches from demographic studies of migration, often in combination with Geographic Information Systems, to overcome these challenges. These studies link individual-level data on migration to local characteristics of the environment, then analyze the migration process using multivariate statistical models. This approach represents a significant advance over both small-scale case studies and country-level analyses.

Two studies by myself and colleagues have applied this approach in Ecuador and Indonesia. In Ecuador, I collected survey data from 400 households and constructed a database that addresses the influence of local environmental conditions on migration.⁴ The study region in the southern Ecuadorian Andes is prone to droughts and is an important center of out-migration to internal and international destinations. These data show that communities with adverse environmental conditions (low rainfall and steep slopes) sent more migrants to nearby destinations but fewer migrants to distant and international destinations. This pattern is inconsistent with the environmental refugees narrative that predicts large-scale migration over long distances, but is consistent with previous studies. For example, in Burkina Faso, rainfall variability increased internal migration but decreased international migration; and in Nepal, local environmental degradation increased short-distance moves but not long-distance moves.⁵

In Indonesia, I am participating in the Study of the Tsunami Aftermath and Recovery, which has collected a unique survey dataset in the region affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In each year since the tsunami, this project has tracked and reinterviewed 10,000 households in Aceh and North Sumatra who were first interviewed in the February 2004 round of the Indonesian National Socioeconomic Survey. Together with colleagues I am using this dataset to examine population displacement following the tsunami.⁶ Our results indicate that, as expected, the tsunami led to high rates of displacement in damaged communities. However, contrary to expectations, most of the displaced remained in or near their origin community, a large proportion stayed with friends or family rather than entering camps, and many returned to their homes within a few months after the tsunami. Vulnerable populations such as the poor were no more likely to be displaced than others.

Most Environmental Migrants Move Short Distances

These are only two studies, but the picture they paint of environmentally induced migration is quite different from the dramatic images conjured by the term “environmental refugees”: Most environmental migrants moved short distances, adverse environmental conditions can actually reduce migration, and vulnerable populations are not necessarily more likely to be displaced. How to explain these results? Migration theory and geography provide some insights. First, a large number of studies have shown that individuals who are educated or better-off are more likely to migrate, due to the costs of migration and greater rewards for the educated. This fact suggests that environmental degradation might reduce migration, particularly to distant destinations, by reducing access to the resources needed to migrate. Second, if the environmental conditions that migrants are responding to vary on a small scale, then a local move might be enough to encounter better conditions or alternative livelihood opportunities.

However, neither of these perspectives is consistent with a view of vulnerable environmental refugees fleeing degradation over long distances or international borders. Instead, the narrative derives from a neo-Malthusian perspective in which vulnerable populations are assumed to have limited capacity to cope with adverse environmental conditions. This school of thought has been largely rejected by social scientists working on related human-environment issues and appears to have little explanatory power in this case.⁷

Our current limited understanding doesn’t allow us to predict with any clarity how migration might respond to future climate change. Large-scale natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the Indian Ocean tsunami displace large numbers of people and the frequency of such events is likely to rise. The Indonesian case illustrates that even extreme events do not necessarily lead to an international refugee crisis. The consequences of more pervasive forms of environmental change such as droughts and soil degradation are less certain, but current research indicates that they are also unlikely to lead to large-scale movements of long-distance migrants. These studies make clear that environmentally induced migration is real and deserves to be on the international agenda, but simplistic views of massive numbers of “environmental refugees” moving across borders should be set aside.

1. Norman Myers, “Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 357, no. 1420 (2002): 609-13.
2. Richard Black, “Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?” Working Paper No. 34, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2001).
3. Jeffrey Groen and Anne Polivka, “Hurricane Katrina Evacuees: Who They Are, Where They Are, and How They Are Faring,” Monthly Labor Review 131, no. 3 (2008): 32-51; and Li Heming and Philip Rees, “Population Displacement in the Three Gorges Reservoir Area of the Yangtze River, Central China: Relocation Policies and Migrant Views,” International Journal of Population Geography 6, no. 6 (2000): 439-62.
4. Clark Gray, “Environment, Land and Rural Out-Migration in the Southern Ecuadorian Andes,” World Development 37, no. 2 (2009): 457-68.
5. Sabine Henry, Bruno Schoumaker, and Cris Beauchemin, “The Impact of Rainfall on the First Out-Migration: A Multi-Level Event-History Analysis in Burkina Faso,” Population and Environment 25, no. 5 (2004): 423-60; and Douglas Massey, William Axinn, and Dirgha Ghimire, “Environmental Change and Out-Migration: Evidence From Nepal,” Population Studies Center Research Report No. 07-615, University of Michigan (2007).
6. Clark Gray et al., “Tsunami-Induced Displacement in Sumatra, Indonesia,” paper presented at the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population International Population Conference, Marrakech, Sept. 27-Oct. 2, 2009.
7. Melissa Leach and James Fairhead, “Challenging Neo-Malthusian Deforestation Analyses in West Africa’s Dynamic Forest Landscapes,” Population and Development Review 26, no. 1 (2000): 17-43; Henrik Urdal, “People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 4 (2005): 417-34; and Eric Neumayer, “An Empirical Test of a Neo-Malthusian Theory of Fertility Change,” Population and Environment 27, no. 4 (2006): 327-36.

Source: Population Reference Bureau

This year’s theme is “Home” in recognition of the plight of more than 40 million uprooted people around the world, many of those who leave their homes due to the increasing effects of climate change. Below is the promotional video for World Refugee Day 2010, featuring UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador Angelina Jolie.

Orphaned at an early age, Swdwmsri lived with her elder brother and his family in Bijni, a rural village in Assam province’s Chirang district. But increasingly unpredictable weather conditions – drought one year, incessant and untimely rains the next – made life gradually harder as the family’s crops repeatedly failed.

With the family on the verge of starvation, Swdwmsri had to drop out of school. Her brother decided not to waste money sowing new crops and instead used his remaining cash to migrate to a nearby city, Guwahati, in search of a job.

Swdwmsri realized she had to find her own means of livelihood. But she had few options. It was then she met a lady from her village who promised her a good job in Guwahati.

THE PERILS OF URBAN WORK

Both nervous and excited, she took up work as a poorly paid maid in several households. She also worked as a baby-sitter in one home – until she was molested by the landlord and forced to flee to a friend’s home. Even the busy city traffic made her anxious, and once she was nearly run down by a speeding bus.

Dismayed by what she saw as a harsh life in the city, Swdwmsri longed to go back to her native village and her favourite activity – weaving the traditional patterns and motifs of her tribe, the Bodos. But like many women displaced by climate change, she found she had few resources or options to improve her situation.

Then one day, as she was waiting to catch a bus, she met an old acquaintance. Bimala, another migrant from Bijni, said she had been able to return home and find work with the Roje Eshansholi (Beloved Weaving) Cooperative Society, a weavers’ collective based in Kokrajhar.

The cooperative, set up by schoolteacher Malati Rani Narzary, seeks to create alternative work and dignity at home for impoverished Bodo tribal women vulnerable to climate change-related displacement, ethnic conflict, and human trafficking.

“I realized that Bodo women … were some of the finest weavers in the region,” Narzary said. “I decided to hone their weaving skills to suit the demands of the national as well as the international market.”

After initial training, weavers and spinners in the program are separated into self-help groups that work in their native villages.

SPINNING A NEW LIFE IN MUGA SILK

From a modest beginning of only five members and four looms in 1996, the society now has over 1,000 women beneficiaries in Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon and Chirang district, some in very remote areas. More than 500 spinners and 50 weavers work in muga silk, the traditional golden silk of Assam.

Young girls like Swdwmsri and Bimala are allowed to stay at a women’s residence at the project’s headquarters, where they feel at home and secure.

“We send part of our earnings to our families. But we would rather stay here and do what we enjoy most – weaving,” Bimala said.

Fashion designers now visit the weavers to help them create new products that will sell well. Swdwmsri remembers how a lady from the National Institute of Design in the Indian city of Ahmedabad came to relate that their traditional handloom material has been turned into scarves, cushion covers, curtains, table mats and other goods.

“I have never used a table mat in my life. But I am happy that my handmade products adorn the homes of the rich and the famous and even plush hotels in big cities,” Bimala said.

Narzary’s aim of giving Bodo weavers a larger platform for their efforts has taken shape in the form of the Bodoland Regional Apex Weavers and Cooperative Federation, an umbrella organization for all the weavers in the area.

The organization has helped weavers showcase their products in trade and textile fairs and fashion shows.

“I feel proud that apart from preserving our age-old weaving tradition, we are also able to hold back our young and vulnerable girls from working as domestic help in big cities. Moreover, they cannot be lured by the unscrupulous middleman and end up in brothels,” said Narzary, who is chairperson of the federation.

Teresa Rehman is a journalist based in Northeast India. She can be reached at www.teresarehman.net

Source: Reuters AlertNet