“I think it’s appropriate to think about [climate change] adaptation or investments in adaptation as investments to open up the range of choices available to people to deal with an uncertain future,” said Jon Barnett, associate professor of geography at the University of Melbourne, in an interview with ECSP. “In some circumstances it might be appropriate to build infrastructure and hard options where we’re very certain about the nature of the risk…but in other cases, expanding the range of choices and freedoms and opportunities that people have to deal with climate change in the future is perhaps the better strategy.”

As her book summary outlines:

Environmental migration is not new. Nevertheless, the events and processes accompanying global climate change threaten to increase human movement both within States and across international borders. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has predicted an increased frequency and severity of climate events such as storms, cyclones and hurricanes, as well as longer-term sea level rise and desertification, which will impact upon people’s ability to survive in certain parts of the world.

This book brings together a variety of disciplinary perspectives on the phenomenon of climate-induced displacement. With chapters by leading scholars in their field, it collects in one place a rigorous, holistic analysis of this phenomenon, which can better inform academic understanding and policy development alike. Governments have not been prepared to take a leading role in developing responses to the issue, in large part due to the absence of strong theoretical frameworks from which sound policy can be developed. The specialist expertise of the authors in this book means that each chapter identifies key issues that need to be considered in shaping domestic, regional and international responses, including the complex causes of movement, the conceptualisation of migration responses to climate change, the terminology that should be used to describe those who move, and attitudes to migration that may affect decisions to stay or leave. The book will help to facilitate the creation of principled, research-based responses, and establish climate-induced displacement as an important aspect of both the climate change and global migration debates.

She includes chapters by familiar and influential migration, human rights, environmental, and legal scholars:

• “Climate Change-Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the Pacific” by Graeme Hugo
• “Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits” by Jon Barnett and Michael Webber
• “Climate-Induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The Meaning and Importance of Land” by John Campbell
• “Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement” by Walter Kälin
• “‘Disappearing States’, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law” by Jane McAdam
• “Protecting People Displaced by Climate Change: Some Conceptual Challenges” by Roger Zetter
• “International Ethical Responsibilities to ’Climate Change Refugees’” by Peter Penz
• “Climate Migration and Climate Migrants: What Threat, Whose Security?” by Lorraine Elliott
• “Climate-Related Displacement: Health Risks and Responses” by Anthony J McMichael, Celia E McMichael, Helen L Berry and Kathryn Bowen
• “Climate Change, Human Movement and the Promotion of Mental Health: What have we Learnt from Earlier Global Stressors?” by Maryanne Loughry
• “Afterword: What Now? Climate-Induced Displacement after Copenhagen” by Stephen Castles

We have yet to read the book, but it seems set to be an essential part of any climate change and migration reader’s diet.

Small Island Developing States are often depicted as being among the most vulnerable of all places to the effects of climate change, and they are a cause célèbre of many involved in climate science, politics and the media. Yet while small island developing states are much talked about, the production of both scientific knowledge and policies to protect the rights of these nations and their people has been remarkably slow.

This book is the first to apply a critical approach to climate change science and policy processes in the South Pacific region. It shows how groups within politically and scientifically powerful countries appropriate the issue of island vulnerability in ways that do not do justice to the lives of island people. It argues that the ways in which islands and their inhabitants are represented in climate science and politics seldom leads to meaningful responses to assist them to adapt to climate change. Throughout, the authors focus on the hitherto largely ignored social impacts of climate change, and demonstrate that adaptation and mitigation policies cannot be effective without understanding the social systems and values of island societies.

This publication is, as Barry Smit, Canada Research Chair in Global Environmental Change at University of Guelph points out, “a timely check on established paradigms and their effectiveness (or otherwise) in contributing to practical adaptation to climate change in vulnerable regions.”

Meanwhile Jon Barnett has been researching climate adaptation in small island states, particularly through the lens of migration, for some time.  His most provocative and recent work released in 2009 was the World Bank-commissioned study “Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change.”  The paper examines the ways in which climate change may increase future migration, and the risks associated with such migration. It also examines how migration may enhance the capacity of communities to adapt to climate change.

You can see a distillation of his views on climate change in the Pacific in this short video interview with the Woodrow Wilson Center:

No one is currently emigrating from Pacific small island states principally due to climate change, according to Australian geographer Jon Barnett of the University of Melbourne. Barnett situates climate change’s potential future impacts within the broader social, political, and economic challenges for residents of small island states, reminding us that there is great physical and political diversity among these islands.

Stressing the mix of pushes and pulls that motivate people to move, Barnett suggests we examine existing patterns of migration to better understand how they will develop in the future. He emphasizes that climate change is most likely to push islanders to move due to declining food production and drinking water availability, rather than sea-level rise—despite the iconic image of lapping waves submerging low-lying countries. These sober reminders on the complexity of climate-migration links are worth keeping in mind when evaluating the plethora of new reports on the topic.

Now, some countries have begun turning this displacement into a positive learning experience by providing such migrants with temporary work permits to help them earn an income and acquire skills, making them more resilient when they return home.

“Extending work visas or granting temporary visas to people from countries … hit by natural disasters is often used in … Europe and North America,” said Koko Warner, head of the Environmental Migration, Social Vulnerability and Adaptation Section at the UN University, and such initiatives were part of a “wider trend in managing the impacts of natural hazards and migration”.

The US Immigration and Nationality Act allows Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to foreign nationals already in the US because of an environmental disaster, provided their country is unable to handle their return.

There are no international laws protecting people forced to move across borders by more intense natural disasters as a result of climate change, but Walter Kälin, Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, cited the Finnish Aliens Act, which also “provides temporary protection (up to three years) in situations of mass displacement as a result of an environmental disaster.”

He suggested that in the absence of such protection, initiatives like the TPS allowed by US could provide “inspiration” to countries to draw up laws offering temporary respite to people forced to move because of climate change.

Colombia shows the way

Colombia has come up with an interesting alternative: in 2006, when the Galeras volcano in southwest Colombia erupted, the government set up a programme allowing several thousand affected people temporary migration to Spain, where they earned an income, mostly through agricultural work, for a period of six months, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) noted in its recent annual report.

“Since then the programme has been expanded to include people in rural communities, where crops and land are vulnerable to floods and other natural disasters,” UNFPA said. The programme is supported by the European Union.

Heavy rains, floods, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions in Colombia affected 1.5 million people in 2007, and at least 700,000 more in 2008, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

In Spain the Colombians acquired skills to help them diversify their income when they returned home, to “increase their resilience to environmental challenges, and offers them an alternative to permanent relocation,” UNFPA commented. The six-month placement period also allowed enough time for the land affected by disaster in Colombia to recover.

Warner said such initiatives were “an important source of post-disaster rehabilitation”, while UNFPA pointed out that “Mobility may therefore contribute to the adaptation of people affected by environmental change; conversely, immobility may increase people’s vulnerability to environmental pressures.”

Source: IRIN

Dr. Tacoli is also of the growing chorus of analysts who cite migration as adaptation rather than as negative consequence. Ultimately, she says, “the failure to recognise the role of voluntary migration in adapting to climate change contributes to crisis-driven movements that inevitably increase the vulnerability of those forced to leave their homes and assets as they flee conflict and disaster…It is worth remembering that supporting migrants can ultimately help reduce the numbers of refugees.”

Below is a complete summary of Dr. Tacoli’s views for the BBC’s The Green Room in an article entitled “Climate migration fears ‘misplaced”.

(BBC News) September 29, 2009 – Fears of millions of “climate refugees” crossing national borders are not supported by evidence on the ground, says Cecilia Tacoli. In this week’s Green Room, she says we will fail to protect the world’s most vulnerable people if misconceptions about migration continue to shape policies. Search the internet for “migration” and “climate change” and you will find repeated warnings of a crisis in the making; of hundreds of millions of people on the move, of countries straining to cope with the pressure on their borders, and of national security under threat.

But these fears are based on many misconceptions about the duration, destination and composition of migrant flows.

There is a real risk that alarmism will divert attention from real problems, resulting in policies that fail to protect the most vulnerable people.

The longer it takes people to realise this, the bigger the true problems will become.

Firstly, the numbers of people likely to be moving have been exaggerated. Secondly, the notion commonly expressed in rich countries – that large numbers of poor people from across the planet will attempt to migrate there permanently – is clearly wrong.

Yes, hundreds of millions of people live in places that are highly vulnerable to climate change.

They face extreme weather conditions such as droughts and floods, or they live in low-lying coastal areas that are threatened by rising sea levels. Their lives and livelihoods are threatened in new and significant ways.

But this does not mean they will all migrate.

The poorest and most vulnerable people will often find it impossible to move, as they lack the necessary funds and social support. Those who can migrate will be more likely to make short-term, short-distance movements than permanent long-term ones.

Overall, long-distance international migration will be the least likely option.

Past lessons

What can we learn from the past? In northern Mali, the drought of 1983-5 affected local migration patterns, with an increase in temporary and short-distance movement and a decrease in long-term, intercontinental movement.

Similarly, recent research in Burkina Faso suggests that a decrease in rainfall increases temporary rural-rural migration.

On the other hand, migration to urban centres and to other nations, which entails higher costs, is more likely to take place after normal rainfall periods.

It is influenced by migrants’ education, the existence of social networks and access to transport and road networks.

In all cases, migrants make substantial contributions to the livelihoods of their relatives and communities, by sending money, information and goods back home.

A surprisingly large proportion of the income of rural people in Africa, Asia and Latin America comes from non-farm activities, and much of it as migrants’ remittances.

With climate change making farming more difficult, the need for these resources will increase.

Unfortunately, most governments and international agencies tend to see migration as a problem that needs to be controlled instead of a key part of the solution.

In doing so, they are missing opportunities to develop policies that can increase people’s resilience to climate change.

Room for new views

Policymakers must radically alter their views of migration, and see it as a vital adaptation to climate change rather than as an unwanted consequence or a failure to adapt.

This means that poorer nations need to prepare for climate change at home by building up infrastructure and basic services in small towns located in rural areas that could become destination hubs for local migrants.

Options include policies that promote access to non-farm jobs in small rural towns and a more decentralised distribution of economic opportunities.

To do so, they should first of all focus on increasing the capacity of local governments and institutions in small towns to support local economic development, provide basic services and regulate equitable access to natural resources.

Richer countries, meanwhile, need to stop panicking about a mass influx of migrants that is unlikely to happen and instead focus on helping the poorer countries to face climate change.

As the richer countries have emitted most of the greenhouse gases that cause climate change, they have a duty to address the problem.

This means providing poorer nations with financial support to help them adapt to climate change, which can either reduce the need for migration or enable it to proceed in a way that is sound and sustainable.

It also means taking drastic domestic action to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases that are causing climate change in the first place.

People are talking about migration as if it were something new, but people have always used their mobility as a means to protect themselves and escape from poverty.

The problem is not that people want to move, but that many of the most vulnerable people do not have the resources or livelihood options that will enable them to do so in a way that maintains their security.

Ironically, the failure to recognise the role of voluntary migration in adapting to climate change contributes to crisis-driven movements that inevitably increase the vulnerability of those forced to leave their homes and assets as they flee conflict and disaster.

It is worth remembering that supporting migrants can ultimately help reduce the numbers of refugees.

Source: BBC News

Tacoli will publish a study, ‘Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility’, in October.

The numbers

Norman Myers, renowned environmentalist and fellow with Oxford University’s 21st Century School, who has just completed a study for the Swedish International Development Agency, said “hundreds of millions” of people could be driven from their homes by environmental crises and degradation by 2040.

NGO Christian Aid in 2007 estimated that up to 250 million people could be displaced by 2050 as a result of climate change effects. And in 2001 a World Bank study by Susmita Dasgupta predicted that sea level rises could force hundreds of millions of people to move within this century.

Up to 70 percent of people living in cities of 5 million or more live within 1km-2 km of seaways, according to the UN.

But the IIED’s Tacoli said the projected migrant figures are inflated, for they tend to be based on population estimates in areas most likely to be affected by climate change, rather than on the number of people most likely to move.

Koko Warner, head of the Environmental Migration, Social Vulnerability and Adaptation Section at the UN University, said too many variables make accurate migrant predictions difficult to impossible.

“When…predicting the environment, we can feel a bit confident – there is a lot of information out there. But when we are studying humans, it’s more dicey….Figures are almost always based on census information undertaken every five to 10 years, so all you get is a snapshot.”

These figures do not indicate why people have left or what the social dynamics behind their movements were, she added.

Myers defended his predictions. “These should not be taken to be gospel truth,” he said. “Rather they are informed estimates. If scientists kept quiet about numbers, then policymakers would say the absence of evidence [means] the absence of a problem.

Local solutions

To date research on natural disaster-related population movements indicates most affected people move within a country’s borders, with the most vulnerable populations the least able to migrate far, with long-distance international migration the least likely option available.

One-off extreme events tend to trigger short-distance, short-term migrations; while longer-term environmental changes tend to generate longer-distance, more permanent migrations, says a 2009 Refugee Studies Centre report by James Morrissey.

Tacoli and others are pushing for policymakers to speed up help to vulnerable states to prepare for climate change at home, for instance by building up infrastructure and basic services in small towns in rural areas that could become destination hubs.

“Small towns in agricultural areas are especially important to provide livelihoods to the poorest groups, who are often landless and do not have the means to migrate to larger cities,” Tacoli told IRIN.

“With many aspects of climate change mitigation it will be local governments that can make the most difference,” she said. “We will need the support of national governments in affected countries to promote this, but at the moment we are talking only about external governments when it comes to migration.”

Boosting local adaptation could also diminish the number of people forced to move in the first place, Warner said.

This must be at the heart of the migrant debate, rather than stirring up “fear-of-migration” rhetoric from policymakers and leaders, many of whom have framed climate change as a national security issue, researchers told IRIN.

Fear rhetoric?

An August report by the US Department of Defense said climate-induced crises and related mass people movements could topple governments, feed terrorist movements or destabilize entire regions. The UK Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) has made similar predictions.

And the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, warned in 2008 that climate-change-related migration “may increase conflict in transit and destination areas. Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure.”

“It’s quite inappropriate for industrialized nations to build barriers – be they institutional, political or mental barriers – across the Mediterranean to bar would-be migrants from passing…if they don’t look at solutions for the numbers – both local and international – they will just get overwhelmed,” Oxford University’s Myers said.

There is some indication that EU member states are approaching a more nuanced picture on environmental migration. The European Commission is funding research in 24 vulnerable countries, to address the dynamics of environmentally-driven migration and examine lessons learned.

Rather than foment panic, leaders should apply lessons from the past to inform both migration and climate change mitigation policies in years to come, Tacoli said.

Source: IRIN

Photo credit: IRIN

(IRIN) September 9, 2009 – Many recent studies have put the number of climate-change-related migrants at between 200 million and one billion by 2050, but critics say given insufficient data it is impossible to estimate the number. Some say inflated figures have spurred “fear-of-migration” rhetoric from policymakers and leaders.

“It seems unlikely the alarmist predictions of hundreds of millions of environmental refugees moving as a result of climate change,” says Cecilia Tacoli, senior researcher with London-based NGO the Institute of Environment and Eco-Development. Tacoli will publish a study ‘Crisis or adaptation? Migration and climate change in a context of high mobility’ in October.

“What is more likely is that we will see current high mobility trends continue and intensify, linked to income diversification.”

Projected migrant figures are based on estimates of the number of people living in areas most likely to be affected by climate change, rather than the number of people who are most likely to move, Tacoli says.

A study released 4 September by the UK government’s Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), notes: “Climate change is an extremely complicated and complex process. Migration is equally a study in its own right. Drawing any direct causal relationships is not only methodologically wrong, it is dangerous.”

One danger of inflating migrant figures, Tacoli says, is that it foments “fear” rhetoric among national leaders, many of whom now frame climate change as a national security issue.

Rhetoric of fear

An August report by the US Department of Defense said climate-induced crises and related mass people movements could topple governments, feed terrorist movements or destabilize entire regions.

The UK Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) states in a global trends 2007-2036 scenario: “Food and water insecurity will drive mass migration from some worst-affected areas and the effects may be felt in more affluent regions through distribution problems, specialized agriculture and aggressive food-pricing.”

And the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana warned in 2008 that climate-change-related migration “may increase conflict in transit and destination areas. Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure.”

Reality

Crisis-led population movements are more complex and less predictable than the methodology in these estimations reflects say the reports by Tacoli and the GSDRC, but some trends have emerged. A 2009 UK-based Refugee Studies Centre report by James Morrissey notes one-off extreme events tend to generate short-term, short-distance migrations; while longer-term environmental changes tend to generate longer-distance, more permanent migrations.

Past climate-change-related displacements have tended to remain within country borders, with long-distance international movement the least likely scenario, according to researchers. And in most cases it is the most well-off who travel the farthest, while the poorest populations are often unable to move, several researchers say.

However a number of renowned researchers and institutions still predict high climate-migrant numbers, while a debate on the legal status of  “climate refugees” is emerging at international climate change talks. A policy paper by the UN University Institute for Environment and Human Security Section notes climate change is already contributing to displacement and migration and projects that in the densely populated Ganges, Mekong, and Nile River deltas, a sea level rise of 1m could affect 23.5 million people.

Way forward

To reframe the debate, rather than looking at environmental “hotspots” as potential migrant sources, it is more useful to think of “hot systems” where vulnerability is high based on several factors: a community’s social dynamics, natural resource management, demographic growth, inter-community tensions and poverty, says the GSDRC.

Given the dearth of accurate data, GSDRC recommends moving forward on a case-study basis and learning from past experience. It highlights as useful models the EU’s environmental change and forced migration scenarios and a study of migration responses to natural disasters by the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Determining more accurate patterns and routes could lead to more appropriate adaptation responses, such as building up infrastructure and basic services like sanitation, piped water, electricity, health clinics and schools in small towns in developing countries, which may turn into destination hubs, researcher Tacoli says.

“Small towns in agricultural areas are especially important to provide livelihoods to the poorest groups, who are often landless and do not have the means to migrate to larger cities.”

Source: IRIN